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Introduction 
John B. Davis 
The concept of need, that is, human material need, is perhaps 
one of the most paradoxical of economic concepts. On the one 
hand, the idea of need seems an inescapable dimension of eco-
nomic life. We can hardly begin to talk about the problems and 
concerns that drive economic thinking without speaking about 
those individuals, families, and communities whose needs go 
unmet and who are hoped to be the principal beneficiaries of 
economic growth and social policy. On the other hand, main-
stream economic theory today-whose prominence and self-
proclaimed scientific standing challenge the most dedicated of 
humanists-denies needs can be distinguished from wants and 
indeed denies that the concept of need has any legitimate stand-
ing in economics whatsoever. Need in the modern world, it 
thus results, is a matter of preeminent concern that nonetheless 
escapes formal recognition. Need is a real, inescapable dimen-
sion of contemporary economic life but is at the same time 
seemingly unworthy of the professional attentions of those who 
devote themselves to the systematic explanation of economic 
life. In short, the very concept of need escapes us, though in 
every day life we continually address our needs and respond 
to those of others in our ordinary practical affairs . 
If nature abhors a vacuum, however, so we also seem ever 
driven to escape the paradoxes of the social world, if only be-
cause the social world is so much our own creation and responsi-
bility . And though the paradox of need appears equally balanced 
upon the manifest reluctance of mainstream economists to ac-
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kno\yledge the concept of need and the continued genuine ex-
pression of need by persons in all domains of life, in fact the 
direction in which this paradox will ultimately be resolved is 
clear. Need will receive formal expression, because its character 
must be understood in order that individuals' real needs be 
clearly understood. Need, as so strikingly represented in the 
1990 World Bank annual report, World Development 1990, devoted 
entirely to the question of world poverty, will ultimately com-
mand systematic attention, because its central place in economic 
life is i~escapably evident even in the face of its sweeping neglect 
by most professional economists. 
The essays collected in this volume make a contribution to 
this future understanding of need. Written together to form an 
integrated account of need and capturing some of the best in-
sights of individuals who have for many years made the concept 
of need a key focus of their thinking about economic life as 
social economics, they lay important methodological and philo-
sophical foundations for explaining the nature and concept of 
need. This brief introduction seeks to answer a question prelimi-
nary in nature to their concerns. Why does mainstream eco-
nomic thinking not only ignore the concept of need but indeed 
',llso declare it unworthy of serious consideration? It seeks to 
answer this question because answering it tells us something 
valuable about how we must go about explaining the concept 
of need. It also seeks to answer this question because the paradox 
of need is in considerable degree the consequence of mainstream 
economists' adherence to a set of unexamined assumptions 
about economic life and the nature of economic reasoning that 
themselves require exposure and critique if the concept of need 
is to achieve the standing that attention to individuals' real needs 
demands. 
\ Why is it, then, that conventional economists feel entitled 
to disregard the concept of need? In essence, the answer is that 
mainstream economics takes the concept of need to be value-
laden, therefore unscientific in nature, where that which is val-
ue-laden or in any way touches upon normative concerns is 
subjective and unworthy of serious consideration. Pure science, 
the aspiration of contemporary mainstream economics, is widely 
believed to be positive and value-free, thereby objective. Accord-
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ingly, in place of the concept of need, conventional economists 
substitute the concept of individual wants, or tastes and prefer-
ences. Wants, it is assumed, may be identified, analyzed, and 
discussed without evaluation or judgment. They require no in-
terpretation, are regarded as pure data, and are thought to be 
factual in nature. Moreover, wants manifestly exceed our means 
and as such are an important element in a science that seeks to 
understand itself as the scientific study of the allocation of scarce 
resources in the presence of unlimited wants. 
From this perspective, the point of entry value judgments 
make in the characterization of need is straightforward to the 
mainstream economist. On the assumption that wants are the 
raw data of individual economic life, the identification of needs 
necessitates a ranking of wants that turns on comparing different 
individuals' wants. To say that such-and-such a want is in fact 
really a need requires saying that all individuals would have 
this want in certain standard circumstances, and that the general 
significance of this particular want then justifies our classifying 
it as a human need. Needs, that is, are not specific to any given 
individual but are generally shared by all individuals. In effect, 
needs are universal wants. However, in the eyes of the main-
stream economist this comparability requirement- or, as it has 
been put in the utilitarian framework of mainstream economics, 
the requirement that we be able to make interpersonal compari-
sons of utility across individuals-simply lacks objective founda-
tion. Since Lionel Robbins's influential Essay on the Nature and 
Significance of Economic Science, mainstream economists have in-
sisted that interpersonal comparisons of utility are essentially 
value-laden and therefore subjective. How, it is typically argued, 
can one individual's wants be compared with another's without 
making value judgments about the relative importance of differ-
ent wants to individuals generally? Since individuals are differ-
ent from one another, each presumably has his or her own 
distinct scale or ranking of wants. Thus, from the neoclassical 
perspective, to say that some single ranking of wants applies 
across all individuals in order to identify a given need is to 
impose some single conception of this ranking out of the many 
possible such conceptions. 
For conventional economists, wants and their rankings are 
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unique to each and every individual. This reflects their status as 
basic uninterpreted data, and as such is captured in conventional 
economists' customary insistence on characterizing wants or 
preferences as exogenous. Further, because each and every indi-
vidual's wants, preferences, or tastes must be unique to the 
individual to whom they belong, it follows that each individual 
is a separate, autonomous identity with tastes known only to 
him or herself. Each individual, that is, is an atomistic being 
for whom the wants, preferences, or tastes of others are an 
impossible object of understanding and whose socioeconomic 
relations to others are necessarily secondary in significance to 
their own status as solitary individuals. Self-interest, it then 
follows, is necessarily the sole foundation for behavior in the 
economic world, since individuals' own wants and tastes can 
alone define their interest. All this, it should be emphasized, 
follows from the simple assertion that the concept of need lacks 
any place whatsoever in economics, since to allow the existence 
of an objective basis for comparing wants across individuals in 
society is tantamount to rejecting the notion that individuals 
are isolated atomistic beings who make their own wants their 
sole object of concern. 
Unfortunately, in a world in which need is real, though in 
,which economic science discourages its discussion, there are 
costs to those truly in need that might largely be avoided were 
the concept of need given formal recognition. In saying, as does 
mainstream economics, that wants alone explain the material 
transactions between people, one makes the ability to pay central 
to any explanation of demand and conceals the dilemma that 
those individuals in the marketplace who have the least ability 
to pay have the most unmet needs. The market understood 
solely in terms of wants, that is, effectively disguises one set of 
economic relations between people with another, since market 
exchange is said to reflect an agreement and harmony of interests 
between free and equal persons, though beneath the surface 
individuals in need are actually at risk and vulnerable as human 
beings. Worse than the concealment of this important reality, 
however, is the response of the market to the unacknowledged 
vulnerability of those in need. Since those whose needs have 
been fulfilled and who pursue inessential wants enjoy the luxury 
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of being able to postpone their market transactions, while those 
in need are compelled to transact for their needs in the market 
in as short a time as possible, the former are able to exercise a 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the latter that puts the latter at an 
even greater disadvantage. When those trading for luxuries can 
wait to purchase and those trading for necessities cannot, market 
prices tend to be lower for luxuries and higher for necessities 
than would be the case were need given the sort of formal 
expression that would justify support for those genuinely in 
need. Moreover, because those in need lack the financial and 
material resources to express their needs in the marketplace, 
while those in pursuit of luxuries typically possess an abundance 
of such resources, the market tends to underproduce those 
goods that satisfy needs and overproduce luxury goods relative 
to what would likely be the case were need given formal expres-
sion and the reality of need to become widely apparent. These 
perverse results-which are at odds with the ordinary morality 
of our society-are the real costs of a science that rigidly defends 
itself as positive and value-free. 
Yet is mainstream economics itself really free of value judg-
ments, as it continually claims itself to be? Close examination 
of conventional economics' critique of the concept of need, it 
turns out, reveals important unexamined assumptions at the 
heart of the idea that interpersonal comparisons are value-laden 
and subjective. On the line of reasoning that flows from Rob-
bins's argument, interpersonal comparisons of utility presup-
pose value judgments because they impose a common ranking 
or scale of wants upon the distinct rankings and scales of }\Tants 
possessed by different individuals. Yet if one insists that ranking 
wants across individuals presupposes value judgments, doesn't 
it also (as Terence Hutchison wondered shortly after the appear-
ance of Robbins's famous Essay) involve value judgments to say 
that single individuals can rank and scale their wants across 
different and distinct episodes of their lives? That is, if interper-
sonal comparisons of utility and well-being presuppose value 
judgments, don't intrapersonal comparisons of utility and well-
being presuppose them as well? And, if the latter are objective 
by the standards of mainstream economics, might it not be the 
case that interpersonal comparisons are also objective by those 
r 
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very same standards? Indeed, might it not even be possible 
that the very reason intra personal comparisons are objective is 
because interpersonal ones are? 
Mainstream economics, not surprisingly, ignores these is-
sues with the standard textbook declaration that economic sci-
ence assumes that individuals can always identify and rank their 
own preferences. Perhaps the problem here is that mainstream 
economists, long wedded to the notion of the atomistic individ-
ual, cannot conceive of any other way of talking about preference 
and taste. This then becomes the natural way of understanding 
the matter, and any discussion of taste and preference across 
individuals, which requires the exercise of judgment and intro-
duces the values of the analyst, by contrast appears arbitrary 
and subjective. As we will see, however, it is not difficult to 
demonstrate that value judgments are also involved in saying 
that individuals can make intra personal comparisons of utility. 
The real issues, rather, appear to concern the kinds of judgments 
and values we employ in making both interpersonal and intra-
personal comparisons of utility, and how these different kinds 
of judgments and values are related to one another. 
Social economists, of course, do not deny that individuals 
identify and rank their own preferences and wants. Their argu-
ment is that in doing so we reason in much the same way and 
make much the same sorts of value judgments that speaking 
about a socially shared scale and ranking of preferences and 
wants requires. Their reasoning, moreover, begins with an im-
plicit sensitivity to one of the traditionally overlooked presuppo-
sitions of discussing rational economic agents as real beings, 
namely, that since economic agents are thought capable of rank-
ing their preferences and wants on any given occasion, then 
they must also be thought able to do this consistently over time. 
Real economic agents, that is, must be thought of as beings that 
survive through time and changes of experience, while carrying 
out programs of economic activity reflecting choices that are 
consistent through time and changes of experience. For this to be 
the case, individuals must be said to sustain personal identities 
amidst change in themselves and their surroundings, and this, 
social economists argue, necessarily presupposes a reliance on 
--
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value judgments that permit us to explain what constitutes per-
sonal identity and what it means to be a person. From this 
perspective, intrapersonal comparisons of utility, because they 
presuppose an individual's personal identity, must themselves 
involve value judgments. Moreover, because our understanding 
of personal identity arguably depends in important respects 
upon our understanding of individuals as social beings, it is fair 
to suppose that those value judgments we make in speaking of 
intra personal utility comparisons are somehow linked to value 
judgments we make in speaking of interpersonal utility compari-
sons. Mainstream economics, however, ignores these manifest 
linkages between personal identity and social identity, and in 
the process fails to investigate the nature of the related value 
judgments underlying each. 
Social economists accordingly argue that a dynamic view 
of intrapersonal comparisons of wants and preferences is bound 
up with the interpersonal comparison of wants and preferences. 
At the most rudimentary level this is manifest in an individual's 
linguistic system, in that an individual's own language of valua-
tion is socially learned, so that the terms in which one keeps 
track of one's own preference rankings over time draw upon a 
public discourse concerning the ranking of wants and prefer-
ences. In the thinking of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
there is no such thing as a truly "private language," since indi-
viduals must always express their own thoughts, however pri-
vate, in a shared language. On this understanding, the linguistic 
standards that individuals develop to rank their tastes and pref-
erences are inevitably social standards. Peter Winch, in his in-
fluential extension of Wittgenstein's thinking to the social sci-
ences, has argued that social standards operate in the sciences 
in establishing the accepted use of concepts and language to 
settle fundamental issues between scientists. Mainstream econo-
mists, we might then conclude, regard preferences as "like" 
only when they belong to the same individual, because the 
standards for preference analysis implicit in their discourse rule 
out judging different individuals' preferences as "like." In con-
trast, social economists, because they recognize the inevitable 
role value judgments play in science, are prepared to investigate~ 
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how different individuals' preferences are "like" one another in 
the · hope of making some progress toward explaining those 
shar~d wants we call needs. 
How, then, might we properly look upon the concept of 
, I 
need in our theoretically more self-conscious investigation of 
wants and preferences? As a first caution, one would not want 
to, say that, because individuals share a common language and 
aiscourse, there is but one system of ranking wants acro'ss indi-
viduals in society, and that all individ':lals implicitly make use 
of that 'same system of evaluation and analysis, Society clearly 
gives abundant evidence of competing and even incompatible 
views of wants and needs, and thus our investigation of need 
, will not produce the overly neat and determinate results that 
often seem to be the goal of positive science. Indeed, an impor-
tant message of the analysis developed in the essays collected 
here is that the necessary involvement of value judgments in 
any serious discussion of need requires that we address a variety 
of issues and considerations that relate to the nature of persons 
and their relations to one another in economic life. This inevita-
bly makes the explanation of need complex and many-sided. 
Nonetheless, the essays collected here still share a common 
understanding of the nature of human material need, Need may 
be defined as a condition of individual deprivation that threatens a 
person's livelihood and integrity as a human being . Of course, the 
specific ways in which this might be true for different individuals 
vary across time and societies. But that needs are different at 
different times and different places does not change the fact that 
individuals find their ,!ery survival as human beings jeopardized 
when their needs go unmet. Recognizing that debates about the 
specific historical character of human material need are inevita-
ble, this collection focuses on this single salient fact. 
Warren J. Samuels, in "Need as a Mode of Discourse," 
opens the collection by arguing that because the economy is an 
institutional complex continually in a process of change, it is 
important to investigate the changing place and nature of the 
concept of need in Western civilization and the forces involved 
in and responsible for this changing conception. For Samuels, 
the meaning, role, and specific content of the concept of need 
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are worked out in the total socioeconomic process in such a way 
as to make one or another particular normative argument in 
society at anyone time. This constitutes what he terms the social 
construction of economic and social reality and is something 
that must generally defy sharp statement, being an ongoing 
matter. Accordingly, Samuels emphasizes need as a mode of 
discourse, in order to represent its conceptual framework in 
terms of the socioeconomic reality in which need is continually 
debated. Need as a mode of discourse, moreover, stands beside 
and interacts with other modes of discourse (e.g., those concern-
ing rights, self-interest, divine will, and so on) and must' thus 
also be understood in relation to the competing claims each 
of these modes makes upon us. Samuels's essay brings out 
complexities of the concept of need in a historically dynamic 
environment and in this way throws light on many of the debates 
over the nature of need. 
Peter L. Danner's "The Person and the Social Economy: 
Needs, Values and Principles" begins by approaching need from 
the most basic perspective of the human person in economic 
life. Each of us has individual needs bound up with our physical, 
spiritual, and emotional requirements, yet each of us also pos-
sesses distinctively social needs that arise out of our personal, 
political, and economic relations to others. How these different 
dimensions of life get expressed and ordered in economic life 
is essentially a matter of the values people espouse, and here 
Danner investigates the three social values that dominate con-
temporary social thinking: liberty (or freedom), equality (or shar-
ing), and fraternity (or community). These three fundamental 
social values themselves underlie and coordinate three main 
principles of organization in economic life, respectively, compet-
itive self-interest, government involvement and intervention, 
and cooperative collaboration. Danner's portrayal well brings 
out the conflicts and harmonies in society's value structure, 
together with their impact on the dilemmas for decision making 
faced by both individuals and groups. 
Edward J. O'Boyle, in "Human Physical Need: A Concept 
That Is Both Absolute and Relative," differentiates need and 
wants by approaching need from the perspective of a duality 
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reasoning, the Homo economicus of conventional economics is 
replaced by a Homo socioeconomicus of social economics, and the 
economist's investigation of instrumental rationality is replaced 
by an investigation of a rationality of ends. For O'Boyle, unmet 
material need undermines the very foundations of human dig-
nity, and social economics and the social economy center princi-
pally on questions regarding the fulfillment of our material 
.', needs. He insists that there is no social economics or social 
economy without the principle of subsidiarity. The greater part 
of his discussion is devoted to careful technical definition and 
explanation of the problems associated with defining and mea-
suring unmet physical needs. Distinguishing absolute and rela-
tive standards of physical needs in current social policy ap-
proaches to need, O'Boyle points out that the absolute standard 
approach implicitly defines human beings In only individual 
terms, while the relative standard approach implicitly defines 
human beings in only social terms. A comprehensive approach, 
which he then develops in detail, combines both approaches 
on the grounds that human beings are both individual and 
social. This entails a classification of unmet needs in terms of 
both income distribution and minimal living standards and per-
mits an exhaustive treatment of need that is correlated with 
existing empirical evidence on need. 
Anthony E. Scaperlanda's "Government Participation to 
Address Human Material Need" investigates whether govern-
ment should address the material needs of individuals in society, 
what this participation might amount to, and how much of this 
participation might be required. Arguing that there is already 
a consensus in our society concerning the variety and level of 
unmet need in the United States and noting that the private 
sector is unable to fully alleviate this unmet need, Scaperlanda 
proposes a model of gov,ernment participation in the economy 
in meeting minimal human material needs that is sensitive to 
tpe conventions of the American politico-economic process. 
Based on theoretical foundations influenced by Thorstein Veblen 
and Clarence Ayres, his analysis takes into account the historical 
interaction between technology and society's institutions and 
serves as a guide to a pragmatic policy making that is capable 
of combining the best from opposed viewpoints concerning the 
.. 
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role of government in the economy. This is an especially valuable 
achievement in regard to any discussion of government policy 
aimed at reducing poverty, since recent studies have demon-
strated a considerable diversity of reasons for poverty. Indeed, 
the importance of an imaginative and flexible approach' to policy 
is especially clear in connection with the intractability of "un-
derclass" poverty, which arguably demands a variety of strate-
gies on different levels. Scaperlanda closes with a set of six 
general guidelines concerning the kind and extent of govern-
ment participation in meeting human material need. 
Edward J. O'Boyle's "The Need for Work as Such: Self-
Expression and Belonging" extends the investigation of need in 
an often unappreciated direction by noting that physical need 
and the need for work are two equally fundamental dimensions 
of human material need. For . O'Boyle, work is organized and 
performed through two main modes or channels, individual 
contribution and teamwork, that reflect the duality of human 
nature as both individual and social. Work also provides persons 
two main opportunities in life that also conform to the duality 
of human nature~ namely, the opportunity for self-expression 
through individual contribution and the opportunity for belong-
ing through one's involvement in work teams or groups. Within 
this framework, O'Boyle examines the character and significance 
of the need for work, providing in the process a large number 
of examples from actual work settings to illustrate the nature 
of work in the contemporary workplace. Allowing that there 
are special risks associated with the needs for self-expression 
and belonging, O'Boyle nonetheless emphasizes that these risks 
only demonstrate the great challenges the workplace presents 
in providing opportunities for personal development. 
Severyn T. Bruyn, in "Social Management and the Self-
Managed Firm," sees a long-range trend in the organization of 
corporations away from systems of command management and, 
toward systems of mutual governance that enhance each work-
er's capacity for self-management. This transition, Bruyn argues, 
has most recently manifested itself in the emergence of increas-
ing employee participation in managing work teams and in over-
seeing work systems. While early on corporations found these 
changes led to greater productivity and profits, social manage-
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ment in recent decades has also come to recognize the role of 
employee participation in making possible greater individual 
self-development. Bruyn provides an extensive and detailed ac-
count of the patterns of growth of self-managed firms and sug-
gests that employee ownership and management are likely to 
become an integral part of corporate life in future years. He 
then speculates on new, more democratic forms of worker coop-
eratives and addresses arguments critical of cooperatives from 
conventional economists. On balance, it appears that worker 
self-managed firms are likely to experience fewer problems than 
traditional command management firms in future years. 
In the concluding "Reconstruction of Mainstream Econom-
ics and the Market Economy," John B. Davis and Edward J. 
O'Boyle summarize the arguments of the previous chapters by 
arguing that a rethinking of market economics entails a rethink-
ing of human nature and that the reconstruction of the market 
economy as a social economy involves devising strategies to 
help workers and consumers achieve greater personal security. 
In mainstream economics, the individual side of human nature 
is emphasized to the exclusion of our social side. Giving this 
latter dimension adequate emphasis changes our vision of the 
market economy and transforms our conception of the most 
basic objectives of economic science. Unmet human material 
need in the workplace and household manifests itself in the 
insecurity experienced by workers and consumers. Yet while 
mainstream economics gives little attention to these needs, the 
social forces afoot that do address them deserve study. Examples 
of private-sector and government initiatives to reform the work-
place are presented. Also, special emphasis is placed on new 
concepts of the neighborhood in today's American cities that 
are beginning to play an important role in identifying and ad-
dressing the unmet needs of the household. 
An understanding of the social economics of human mate-
rial need involves a fundamental reorientation in thinking about 
economic life away from the accepted and customary approaches 
that characterize mainstream economics. That the magnitude of 
this task is only beginning to be appreciated by professional 
economists is disappointing. Yet at the same time, that signifi- ") 
cant progress has been made to reconstitute the foundations of 
__ ----------------------------------------------------~~~~========~~~J 
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an economic science cognizant of need gives us good reason to 
be optimistic. The essays in this book review and investigate 
these systematic foundations, elaborating upon their rationales 
and detailing their principles of analysis. We hope they will 
provide the impetus for further serious study of human material 
need in all its manifestations. 
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